Russia Signals a Comeback for the Russia-India-China Alliance
Russia’s top diplomat, Sergey Lavrov, isn’t giving up on the idea of bringing India and China back to the table — together — under the old RIC format, a trilateral group that has long floated somewhere between symbolic unity and diplomatic window dressing. Speaking at a Eurasian security gathering this week, Lavrov called for a revival of the Russia-India-China dialogue, suggesting that the moment might finally be “right” again.
“Now that, as I understand it, an understanding is being reached between India and China on how to calm the border situation,” Lavrov said, “I believe the time has come to revive the RIC trio.”
It’s a curious moment for this suggestion — not entirely unexpected, but still, notable. The border conflict between India and China, particularly since the deadly Galwan clash in 2020, has essentially frozen this trilateral format in diplomatic ice. So, Lavrov’s timing — and framing — is deliberate.
Why now?
At face value, the idea makes sense for Moscow. Russia, facing deepening isolation from the West after its invasion of Ukraine, has leaned more heavily into its eastern partnerships — especially with China. But India, though part of the BRICS grouping and still a major buyer of Russian energy and defense equipment, hasn’t exactly moved in lockstep with Moscow or Beijing. If anything, India has deepened its ties with the U.S. and Europe in recent years (Carnegie India).
Lavrov seems to be suggesting that with India and China slowly stabilizing things on the Line of Actual Control, the geopolitical air might be clearing just enough to allow for a three-way reset. Whether that’s realistic — or strategic posturing — is another matter.
Also worth noting: Lavrov explicitly accused NATO countries of trying to drive a wedge between New Delhi and Beijing. That’s not new — Russian officials have often framed Western influence in Asia as destabilizing — but it underscores how Moscow still sees itself as a kind of balancer or “honest broker” in Asian affairs, even as its leverage shifts.
Is India ready to re-engage?
This is where things get complicated. India’s relationship with Russia remains strong — historically rooted, economically significant, and politically useful. But India’s tensions with China are far more than border skirmishes. They cut to deeper issues of regional influence, trade imbalances, and global alignment.
India often walks a careful line. It buys Russian oil at discounts, avoids condemning Moscow at the UN, and retains a degree of “strategic autonomy” that allows it to be in multiple camps at once. Reviving RIC might not conflict with India’s broader goals — but it might not serve them either. At least not in a concrete way.
What’s China’s stake in this?
For Beijing, the RIC format has always been a bit of a side project — not as central as BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), but a useful regional narrative. Right now, China may see some utility in appearing to stabilize things with India, particularly as it grapples with a slowing economy, a strained U.S. relationship, and ongoing tensions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.
So… does this matter?
To be honest, this reminds me of the late-stage SCO summits I’ve covered — where grand statements are made, communiqués are issued, and very little changes on the ground. That doesn’t mean the RIC format is meaningless, but it often struggles to move beyond aspirational language. No formal trade pact, no mutual defense cooperation, no binding commitments.
Still, the symbolism could matter. If India and China agree to sit down with Russia, even in a semi-formal way, it could suggest a willingness to reduce friction — or at least freeze it. And from Moscow’s vantage point, RIC is a chance to stay relevant in Asian affairs at a time when its options are narrowing.
Final thought
Lavrov’s call to revive RIC is part nostalgia, part necessity. For Russia, it’s a strategic card worth playing. For India and China, it might be an opportunity to de-escalate without making overt concessions. Or it might just be another round of carefully staged diplomacy — useful mostly for what it doesn’t say out loud.
